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ABSTRACT
Existing models of organizational crisis response eff ectiveness provide useful insights but are 
limited in terms of off ering a guide for practitioners dealing with actual crisis situations. This 
analysis examines the relative eff ectiveness of image repair tactics based on diff erences in root 
causes of crisis events. Results suggest that certain image repair tactics are seen as the most and 
the least eff ective regardless of crisis type. At the same time, there were some diff erences across 
crisis types that could guide practitioner tactic choices. Limited results here and in past research 
raise questions about whether image repair tactic eff ectiveness can be usefully mapped to situ-
ational variables, such as audience or crisis type. This article concludes with discussion on this 
matter and suggestions for future research.
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Organizations must be continually prepared to respond to crises, rec-
ognizing the potential for high fi nancial and/or reputational costs. 
Crisis practitioners must understand how to deal with crisis situations 
quickly, avoid speculation, and apply strategy grounded in “insights that 
can be applied eff ectively and ethically under extraordinary pressures 
of limited time and severe scrutiny of the organization’s legitimacy” 
(Heath, 2010, p. 3). Ideally, clear crisis plans based on such strategy 
are readily available, but the reality is oft en quite diff erent. Accord-
ing to a 2014 international crisis management survey, 20%–25% of 
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respondents, including organizations that classified themselves as high-
risk operations, did not have a plan (“Preparing for Crisis,” 2014).
Understanding how and what to communicate during a crisis is a 
critical part of any crisis plan. It is essential that researchers engage in 
work to help determine what constitutes effective crisis communica-
tion and what industry best practices should be. However, according to 
Coombs (2014), “effective applied communication does help to improve 
the field to which it is applied. Unfortunately, the academic literature 
on crisis communication is both vast and difficult to assess at times, 
making it of limited value to crisis communicators” (para. 30).
Some have called for more empirical testing of crisis communica-
tion tactics (An & Cheng, 2010; Avery, Lariscy, Kim, & Hocke, 2010; 
Blaney, 2016; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), and in response to that call, this 
quantitative analysis examines the relative effectiveness of image repair 
tactics for various organizational crisis types. It applies Benoit’s typol-
ogy, one of the most recognized frameworks for examining corporate, 
political, and organizational crisis responses (see Benoit, 1995b, 2006; 
Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 
1999; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; DiSanza, Legge, Allen, & Wilde, 2012; 
King, 2006). Most research using the typology comprises qualitative 
case studies focused on singular crisis events. These approaches have 
obvious limitations in terms of making general claims about the impact 
of different tactics in crisis situations. Because testing the effective-
ness of such claims is vital if research is to advise practitioner choices, 
research must begin to map tactical choices onto contingencies like 
audience and crisis type. This study, therefore, was guided by the fol-
lowing research question: What specific image repair tactics result in 
more positive and/or more negative perceptions of an organization 
based on differences in crisis type?
Literature Review
Some quantitative tests of image repair in organizations have focused 
on the relative effectiveness of different tactics. For example, Twork 
and Blaney (2013) tested the premise that mortification combined with 
promises of corrective action would be more effective than mortifica-
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tion only. They found no significant differences between approaches. 
Dawar and Pillutla (2000) discovered that, in the case of a harmful 
consumer product, clear mortification, clear recall measures (corrective 
action), and restitution (compensation) were superior to stonewalling 
and ambiguous attempts at mortification and corrective action. In a 
related study, Spence, Lachlan, and Omilion-Hodges (2016) looked 
for differences in the impact of mortification and corrective action on 
participants’ perceptions of organizational reputation; however, both 
were found to be equally effective. Cos, Worrell, and Blosenhauser 
(2016) exposed audiences to different paired tactics and found that 
audiences exposed to mortification and corrective action had more 
positive feelings toward the organization than those exposed to mini-
mization and transcendence. When respondents in the study were 
asked what they would have liked to have heard from the offending 
organization, 53% responded with comments that could be categorized 
as corrective action.
Some past work has tied image repair tactic effectiveness to crisis 
type in ways that are similar to our goals in this study. Most of this 
work tests Coombs’s (2007) situational crisis communication theory 
(SCCT). SCCT suggests that crisis managers will select more effective 
persuasive response tactics if they understand the kind of crisis situ-
ation they are experiencing. Based on attribution theory, Coombs’s 
(2006) theory suggests that the reputational threat a crisis presents 
is defined by the audience’s perception of four things: (a) crisis type, 
as determined by the audience’s perception of whether responsibility 
for the crisis was external or internal; (b) severity of the damage; (c) 
whether organizational history includes many or few past crises; and 
(d) relationship history, defined as the audience’s attribution of the 
quality of the relationship it has with stakeholders.
Audience attributions are seen as resulting from how the media 
“frame” and cover the crisis—specifically the facts and values that they 
choose to emphasize—thereby influencing how the audience perceives 
the crisis. According to Coombs (2007), except in cases of crises that 
unfold online, “the frames used in the news media reports are the frames 
that most stakeholders will experience and adopt” (p. 171).
Coombs’s (2007) model includes a set of recommended response 
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tactics to match crisis type that should produce maximum image repair 
benefits. Empirical support for matching response tactics to crisis types 
is mixed. Coombs and Holladay (1996) found that matching crisis re-
sponse to crisis type produced significantly more reputational benefits 
to the organization than mismatched responses, although the effect sizes 
were small. Other studies (Brown & White, 2011; Claeys, Cauberghe, 
& Vyncke, 2010) found no significant improvement in organizational 
reputation when crisis strategies were matched to crisis type.
This study is consistent with the goals of work grounded in Coombs’s 
model. However, as explained later, we take a different approach to op-
erationalizing crisis type in an attempt to uncover findings that are both 
more robust and more useful for real-world practitioner applications.
Method
This study adds to the body of quantitative research testing image re-
pair strategy effectiveness. It was designed as a continuation of earlier 
exploratory work (Gribas, DiSanza, Legge, Hartman, & Santee, 2016) in 
which audience type, based on audience perceptions of responsibility 
and severity, was considered as a possible influence on tactic impact. 
In the current study, the focus is not on audience type but rather on 
crisis type.
Classifying Organizational Crisis Types
The approach to defining crisis type here is grounded in practical appli-
cation. When crises arise, public relations (PR) practitioners are called 
on to make quick messaging decisions that are truthful and ethical, that 
protect affected publics, and that also minimize image damage and/
or maximize image repair. As noted earlier, it would be best for these 
decisions to be based on solid, empirically verified guidelines rather 
than on speculation or instinct.
Models provided by both Benoit (1995a, 2015) and Coombs (2006) 
offer valuable insight into the world of organizational image repair; 
however, both are limited in their capacity as the basis for a real-world, 
real-time guide. Benoit’s (1995a, 2015) model is, by design, a typology 
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only rather than a predictive tool. The many case studies based on 
the typology offer valuable help, as practitioners, aware of these case 
studies, can draw connections between a current crisis and what has 
worked (and not worked) in the past in a similar situation. However, 
PR practitioners would need to be extremely well read to be aware of 
enough cases to make this approach viable. Also, inevitable differences 
between past organizational crises and any current situation make even 
the most informed reasoning by analogy tenuous at best.
Coombs’s (2006) SCCT model, on the other hand, is designed for 
predictive insight. As noted, empirical support for its theorized pre-
dictions is limited. Yet even if SCCT had stronger empirical support, 
its usefulness to PR practitioners would be questionable. To apply 
Coombs’s model, a PR manager would need to accurately gauge the 
following in the very early stages of a crisis: audience determination of 
responsibility as external or internal, audience assessment of damage 
severity, audience awareness of the organization’s past crisis history, and 
audience’s judgment of the relationship quality between organization 
and stakeholders. Gauging such perceptual complexity would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible. These are essentially individual-level variables, 
and as Benoit (2015) has pointed out, audiences are not monolithic. For 
example, some may view crisis damage as relatively small, while others 
see the same result as severe, or while some are keenly aware of past 
crises in the organization’s history, others are unaware of that history. It 
is likely, especially in the early stages of a crisis, that the organization is 
“simultaneously in multiple situations” (Benoit, 2015, p. 38). Addition-
ally, almost every organizational crisis today unfolds online as well as 
in the mainstream media. The explosion in online news sources, social 
media, and microblogs has reduced the mainstream media’s ability to 
frame the particulars of a crisis in any unified way, likely exacerbating 
the perceptual fragmentation in any target audience.
To provide usable advice for practitioners, we wanted something 
more than an image repair strategy typology, but we also wanted a way 
to assess crisis type based on something less complex and more immedi-
ately accessible than individual attributional and perceptual variations. 
We considered Campbell’s (1999) list of nearly 40 crisis types, Coombs’s 
(1999) somewhat reduced list (natural disasters, malevolence, technical 
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breakdowns, human breakdowns, challenges, megadamage, organiza-
tional misdeeds, workplace violence, and rumors), and numerous PR 
or business communication textbooks that contain similarly extensive 
lists of possible threats to organizations. From this, we sought to iden-
tify a small number of mutually exclusive and reasonably exhaustive 
categories. The result was a four-category scheme for organizational 
crisis type based on general root cause: malevolence, managerial failure, 
systemic failure, and natural disaster.
A malevolence crisis occurs when an actor inside or outside the 
organization takes serious action, often to express anger toward the 
organization. Such action includes shootings, bombings, sabotage, 
product tampering, or malicious rumors designed to damage the or-
ganization. For example, in 1982, a still unknown person laced Tylenol 
capsules with potassium cyanide, killing seven people. Other examples 
include the Pepsi syringe scare of 1993 and the Wendy’s finger incident 
in 2005. In these cases, people made fraudulent claims about a product 
to bring a tort lawsuit against the firm.
In a managerial failure crisis, management knowingly acts in ways 
that cause harm or risk of harm for organizational stakeholders or 
knowingly chooses not to act to prevent such harm or risk. Lerbin-
ger (1997) suggested that manager-created crises usually result from 
some combination of skewed management values, deception, and 
misconduct. The uncontrollable acceleration problems of some Toyota 
vehicles were blamed on Toyota’s skewed emphasis on production over 
quality and clearly fit into the managerial failure category. The subprime 
mortgage crisis that led to the Great Recession was created by all three 
managerial causes at several of America’s biggest investment banks and 
mortgage insurers.
Systemic breakdown crises can occur in any complex, tightly coupled 
organizational environment and usually include unlikely or difficult to 
anticipate technological failures or technology–human interface errors. 
The Chernobyl disaster and the flawed Affordable Care Act online 
rollout fit into this crisis type category.
Finally, a natural disaster crisis occurs when there is damage to 
life, property, or the environment through weather or other “acts of 
God.” For example, an airliner crashing because of an unpredictable 
Organizational Image Repair Tactics and Crisis Type 231
microburst is an example of a natural disaster. Another example is 
when fires forced almost 90,000 people, the entire community of Fort 
McMurray, Alberta, Canada, to be evacuated in May 2016.
While it has some similarities to what Coombs (2007) called “crisis 
clusters,” this categorization scheme differs in that it does not ask PR 
practitioners to assess complex patterns of audience perception to 
match an appropriate image repair strategy. An overarching narrative 
about the root cause of a crisis is more identifiable, consensual, and 
stable than estimations of audience organizational knowledge, judg-
ments, and attributions. It is in this way that we believe our approach 
offers promise as the basis of a more practitioner-friendly and usable 
crisis response guide.
Image Repair Strategies and Tactics
This study employed Benoit’s (1995a, 1997, 2015) typology, which outlines 
five general ways people and organizations respond to accusations of 
wrongdoing: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness 
of the event, corrective action, and mortification.
Denial includes both simple denial and shifting the blame. Simple 
denial occurs when the accused rejects the existence of or involvement 
in the wrongdoing, and shifting the blame occurs when the accused 
attempts to avoid blame by shifting it to another individual or orga-
nization.
Evasion of responsibility includes making one of four tactical argu-
ments: (a) The act was in response to another’s wrongful act (provoca-
tion), (b) it was not possible to act otherwise given a lack of informa-
tion or ability (defeasibility), (c) the act was an uncontrollable mistake 
(accident), or (d) the motivation for the act was positive or virtuous 
(good intentions).
Reducing offensiveness of an event includes six tactical variants: (a) 
redirecting negative perceptions by focusing on positive characteristics 
or good things the accused has done in the past (bolstering), (b) arguing 
that the act is not as bad as some may think (minimization), (c) mak-
ing an untoward act look more favorable by comparing it to other less 
favorable options (differentiation), (d) reframing an issue with a focus 
on higher and more important issues (transcendence), (e) questioning 
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the credibility of whoever is making accusations (attacking the accuser), 
and (f) alleviating blame by reimbursing victims (compensation).
Finally, corrective action occurs when the accused promises a plan 
to deal with the consequences of the problem and/or to prevent a simi-
lar problem in the future, and mortification occurs when the accused 
admits responsibility and asks for forgiveness.
Other typologies exist (e.g., Coombs, 1998), though they are less 
comprehensive. Few have even suggested additions to the Benoit ty-
pology, and when suggested (e.g., Brinson & Benoit, 1999), the addi-
tions have not been adopted by later researchers. Therefore the more 
exhaustive and discriminating nature of Benoit’s typology made it the 
best option for this study.
Participants
Participants were students attending a mid-sized public university in 
the Intermountain West of the United States. Instructors of various 
communication courses were contacted and asked to assist in recruit-
ing individuals from their classes by announcing the opportunity to 
participate during a class session. Interested students were given in-
formation related to accessing an online questionnaire. Cooperating 
instructors were asked to offer some minimal extra credit as incentive 
for participation, and all participants were given the opportunity to 
be entered into a drawing for one of two $100 Amazon gift cards by 
voluntarily identifying themselves by name and cooperating instructor. 
A total of 323 individuals provided surveys usable for this study. Most 
students were enrolled in courses that were part of university general 
education requirements, resulting in a sample broadly representing 
the campus population.
Online Questionnaire
Online materials directed participants to indicate consent by marking a 
check box and advancing to the survey questionnaire. The online ques-
tionnaire first directed each participant to read one of four scenarios—
determined by a random selection process—relating to the collapse of 
a university building balcony that resulted in 95 injured students and 
3 deaths. The basic scenario/crisis outcome was the same for all, but 
each participant received a scenario edited in a way that framed the 
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organizational crisis as one of four types based on the ultimate root 
cause of the crisis: malevolence, managerial failure, systemic failure, and 
natural disaster. For example, the following was the unique crisis fram-
ing for participants who were presented with the malevolence scenario:
Further investigation revealed that the support struts had been pur-
posely weakened. The investigation quickly focused on a disgruntled 
former employee at the university’s maintenance shop who was recently 
fired. When he was arrested and questioned, the former employee 
admitted to the crime.
This manipulation allowed for examination of differences in perceived 
effectiveness of tactics across crisis types.
Then each participant considered 14 possible organizational re-
sponses made by the president of the university in follow-up to the 
crisis. Organizational responses each represented one image restoration 
tactic reflected in the Benoit (1995a, 2015) typology. For example, the 
following item was designed to have participants consider a “simple 
denial” tactic:
Take a moment to reflect again on what you just read about the incident 
at Millersville State University. Be sure to think through the scenario 
carefully, stopping to reflect on all the information provided.
 Now imagine that, approximately one week after the collapse, you 
are watching a televised report related to the incident. Part of the report 
includes video of the President of Millersville State University who has 
prepared an official statement.
 Now imagine the following—Even though the President addresses a 
number of issues, at the end of the presentation, it seems clear to you 
that his main point could be summarized as follows: “The university 
was not in any way responsible for the incident.” If the President fo-
cused on this in the report, indicate the likely impact that would have 
on your perception of the university.
Participants were presented with each response individually, one at 
a time, and rated each response before moving to the next for consid-
eration. They rated each response on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 
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(This would have a very negative effect on my perception of the organi-
zation) to 10 (This would have a very positive effect on my perception of 
the organization). The sequence of these 14 organizational responses 
was randomized for each participant to avoid order bias.
Analysis
Consistent with the analysis approach taken by Gribas et al. (2016), the 
data were examined in two ways. First, mean scores for positive and/
or negative impact of each image repair tactics were calculated. These 
average scores were calculated for the total sample as well as for each 
of the four crisis types (malevolence, managerial, systemic, natural di-
saster) to allow for a simple comparison. Second, MANOVA was used, 
with crisis type serving as the single fixed factor and effect ratings for 
each of the 14 Benoit image repair tactics serving as multiple dependent 
variables. Post hoc analysis was performed for all dependent variables 
showing significance.
Results
As explained earlier, a random selection process was used to place 
online survey participants into one of four crisis type groups. Of the 
323 participants included in this analysis, 74 responded to a crisis sug-
gesting malevolence, 70 to a crisis suggesting managerial failure, 93 to 
a crisis suggesting systemic failure, and 86 to a crisis suggesting natural 
disaster as the root cause.
Rankings of Image Repair Tactics for Crisis Types
Table 1 shows the means and relative rank ordering of the image repair 
tactics for each crisis type as well as the means and rank orderings for 
the overall sample. One thing that stands out from this table is that 
there is a good deal of similarity across crisis types in terms of the 
relative rankings of the 14 tactics. Compensation and corrective action 
were ranked 1 and 2 (or tied for 2), respectively, for all four crisis types, 
suggesting that these tactics are perceived as having the most positive 
impact on organizational image regardless of crisis type. In fact, these 
two tactics along with mortification and good intentions made up the 
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top four spots across all crisis types. These consistencies offer support 
for previous claims that
corrective action, compensation, and mortification are all likely to help 
in a crisis and almost certainly will not hurt an organization’s image, 
as long as the image repair messages are perceived by audiences as 
sincere, and the organization follows through with commitments to 
correct problems or compensate victims. (Gribas et al., 2016, p. 54)
On the other end of the ranking spectrum, with only minor excep-
tions, attacking the accuser, provocation, shifting blame, and simple 
denial were the four tactics perceived as having the most negative impact 
on organizational image across crisis types. So, overall, the rankings 
show a good deal of similarity across crisis types for both the highest 
ranked and lowest ranked tactics. Comparisons of these data to data 
from earlier research (Gribas et al., 2016) suggest that certain tactics 
just seem to be overall better and worse regardless of the crisis situation.
MANOVA and Post Hoc Analyses
The purpose of this study was to uncover ways in which the posi-
tive or negative impacts of particular image repair tactics seem to be 
dependent on crisis type. The foregoing consideration of means and 
relative rankings of tactics across crises suggests that crisis type makes 
rather little difference. However, results from a more robust analysis, 
applying MANOVA and follow-up post hoc procedures, offer more 
finely tuned insights.
The results of the MANOVA were statistically significant, F(42, 
924) = 3.436, p < .000, Pillais’s trace = .405, partial η2 = .135, support-
ing the idea that the degree to which image repair tactics influence 
audience perceptions of an organization during a crisis is impacted 
by crisis type. Because of this, follow-up ANOVAs were conducted to 
determine which of the 14 tactics seem to be dependent on crisis type. 
A Bonferroni correction suggested applying an alpha of .0036 or lower 
to indicate significance for the follow-up ANOVAs.
From the follow-up ANOVAs, 5 of the 14 tactics showed signifi-
cance based on the corrected alpha: simple denial, F(3, 319) = 9.961, 
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p < .000; shifting blame, F(3, 319) = 11.693, p < .000; defeasibility, 
F(3, 319) = 10.989, p < .000; accident, F(3, 319) =22.457, p < .000; and 
good intentions, F(3, 319) = 6.692, p < .000. Results for transcendence, 
F(3, 319) = 3.885, p < .009, approached significance at the corrected level 
and would have been highly significant for an uncorrected ANOVA. 
Because of this, and because of the unique nature of transcendence 
noted in related research by Gribas et al. (2016), it was included in 
follow-up considerations.
Tables 2 and Table 3 show relevant information for the six tactics 
considered here. Table 2 includes mean scores for interpretation and 
also includes superscript designations that identify sets of crisis types 
for which specific tactic ratings significantly differ. Table 3 simplifies 
this same information by eliminating mean scores and, instead, listing 
all tactics that showed significant differences for particular crisis type 
pairings.
None of the tactics in Table 2 was among the very highest rank-
ing overall tactics (see Table 1). Of the tactics that showed significant 
TABLE 3 Significant Tactic Effectiveness Differences for Crisis Type Pairings
Crisis type
Crisis type Managerial Systemic Natural disaster
Malevolence simple denial
shift blame
defeasibility
accident
good intentions
simple denial
shift blame
accident
shift blame
accident
Managerial defeasibility
accident
good intentions
simple denial
defeasibility
accident
good intentions
transcendence
Systemic
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differences across crisis type, good intentions, transcendence, and ac-
cident were ranked 4, 5, and 6, respectively, overall; defeasibility fell in 
the middle of the tactic ranking order; and simple denial and shifting 
blame were the bottom two ranked tactics overall. So the consistency 
in relative rankings for the highest ranked tactics noted earlier appears 
to be validated by the lack of significant differences found in the post 
hoc analysis. On the other hand, despite general consistency in relative 
rankings for lowest ranked tactics (Table 1), simple denial and shift-
ing blame in particular still reflect statistically significant differences 
across crisis type.
Table 3 shows that there were significant differences for five tactics 
across the managerial–malevolence crisis type pairing. The same was 
true for the managerial–natural disaster pairing. In fact, four of the five 
tactics showing significant differences in these two pairings were the 
same: simple denial, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. In all 
cases, these tactics were perceived as having a more negative impact 
on organizational image in the managerial crisis case than in either 
the malevolence case or the natural disaster case. For the managerial–
malevolence pairing, shifting blame showed a similar pattern, and for 
the managerial–natural disaster pairing, transcendence showed the 
same pattern.
So these two pairings, managerial–malevolence and managerial–
natural disaster, reflected the greatest number of significant differences. 
The managerial–systemic pairing also reflected significant differences; 
managerial significantly differed from systemic for the simple denial, 
shifting blame, and accident tactics. All three of these tactics were 
viewed as more problematic for the managerial crisis situation than 
for the systemic failure crisis situation.
As noted, the malevolence crisis situation differed significantly 
from the managerial crisis situation. Malevolence also showed signifi-
cant differences from systemic and from natural disaster. Specifically, 
simple denial, shifting blame, and accident differed significantly in 
the malevolence–systemic pairing, while shifting blame and accident 
differed significantly in the malevolence–natural disaster pairing. So 
just as managerial differed from all other crisis types in some way, ma-
levolence similarly differed from all others. In every case of significant 
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difference, tactic effectiveness ratings were lower for managerial than 
for all other crisis types, but that was not true for malevolence pairings. 
The accident tactic was viewed less positively for malevolence than 
for systemic or natural disaster, but in all other cases, tactics showing 
significant differences were viewed more favorably in a malevolence 
crisis situation than for other crisis types.
Finally, the only crisis type pairing for which no significant differ-
ences emerged was systemic–natural disaster. This does make some 
intuitive sense, especially given that image repair is always a response 
addressing issues of crisis event responsibility and causality. Systems 
may be designed by human agents, but the interdependence of system 
parts and the complexity of many systems are such that identifying any 
individual source for blame or for attributing causality would be difficult 
at best. Similarly, most accept that a natural disaster is an unpredictable 
event that defies any kind of causal attribution.
Discussion and Conclusions
Effective crisis planning requires reliable insight into image repair tactic 
selection. The root cause crisis type scheme applied in this study seemed 
to work well to identify unique variations regarding tactic appropriate-
ness. Overall, our results demonstrate that compensation, corrective 
action, and mortification are broadly effective strategies to use, while 
the remaining strategies are either not recommended or should be ap-
plied only after careful consideration of root cause as well as audience 
and situational particulars.
We have noted that effective crisis planning must allow practitioners 
to deal with a crisis quickly, avoid speculation, and “provide insights that 
can be applied effectively and ethically under extraordinary pressures 
of limited time and severe scrutiny of the organization’s legitimacy” 
(Heath, 2010, p. 3). Given this challenge, guidelines like the ones just 
suggested, although helpful, may be too general to guide truly strategic 
crisis planning. Therefore we offer the following crisis planning tactic 
selection guidelines based on the results of this study.
Recall that the scale used to rate image repair tactic appropriate-
ness ranged from a low of 1 (This would have a very negative effect on 
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my perception of the organization) to a high of 10 (This would have 
a very positive effect on my perception of the organization). It makes 
some intuitive sense to split that range exactly in half at a score of 5.5 
and to consider tactics rated in the upper half as ones we would rec-
ommend. This approach would be reasonable because we would be 
recommending tactics rated as having at least some overall positive 
effect on improving people’s perceptions of the organization. However, 
given the somewhat negatively skewed distribution of scores for these 
tactics, such an approach would lead us to “not recommend” the vast 
majority of strategies under any circumstances. This would offer a 
very limited and limiting set of options to practitioners designing cri-
sis response plans. Instead, for the purposes of suggesting crisis plan 
recommendations, we determined that tactics scoring an average of 
above 5.0 should be categorized as “recommend” and anything at or 
below 5.0 categorized as “do not recommend.” Though a tactic with 
an average score between 5.0 and 5.5 is still technically on the “would 
have a negative effect” side of the continuum, we can safely deduce that, 
to achieve that average, a good percentage of respondents did rate it 
positively. For example, the overall average across crisis types for the 
accident strategy was 5.0; however, almost 40% of all respondents rated 
that strategy from 6 to 10, indicating that it would have some degree 
of positive effect on their perceptions.
In the world of crisis management, it is often the case that the goal 
is to minimize damage rather than to prevent it and to do as much 
good as possible with as many as possible. Finding strategies that make 
sense for a particular crisis situation that are likely to have a positive 
impact on most or all is likely unrealistic. Therefore we suggest the 
following in terms of tactics recommended and not recommended for 
consideration as part of a crisis response plan targeted to particular 
crisis types:
For Any Crisis Type
• Recommend: compensation, corrective action, mortification, 
good intentions
• Do not recommend: simple denial, shift blame, attack accuser, 
differentiation, bolstering, provocation
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Additions for Malevolence Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence
• Do not recommend: accident, minimization, defeasibility
Additions for Managerial Failure Crisis Type
• Recommend: N/A
• Do not recommend: accident, minimization, defeasibility, tran-
scendence
Additions for Systemic Failure Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence, accident, minimization
• Do not recommend: defeasibility
Additions for Natural Disaster Crisis Type
• Recommend: transcendence, accident, minimization, defea-
sibility
• Do not recommend: N/A
These guidelines reinforce our earlier discussion; a handful of tac-
tics, no matter the crisis, are most likely to improve the organiza-
tion’s image among audience members. Three of these—compensa-
tion, corrective action, and mortification—are consistent with what 
Coombs called “accommodative” strategies or tactics that focus on 
victims’ concerns. Conversely, six tactics appear to have a more nega-
tive effect on audience perceptions of the organization across all cri-
sis types. Four of these—simple denial, shifting the blame, attacking 
the accuser, and provocation—are similar to Coombs’s description 
of “defensive” strategies that work more to protect the organization. 
Therefore the results reinforce that, if it is at all possible, organizations 
experiencing a crisis should adopt accommodative tactics and avoid 
defensive tactics.
However, this general principle cannot be fully embraced, because 
accident and defeasibility are clearly defensive rather than accommo-
dative, and these show on the “recommend” list for some crisis types. 
Additionally, avoiding the defensive tactics is not always possible or 
reasonable. During the 1993 Pepsi scare, when foreign objects (syringes, 
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bullets, etc.) were found in the soft drink’s cans and plastic bottles, the 
Pepsi crisis team engaged in simple denial, claiming that the objects 
could not have been introduced at the bottling plant. Pepsi circulated 
press releases with vivid graphics showing bottles hanging upside down 
until a split second before they were filled, demonstrating the difficulty 
of inserting objects at the plant. Pepsi’s claims were supported by the 
Food and Drug Administration’s commissioner, David Kessler, who 
agreed Pepsi was the victim of copycat hoaxes. Additionally, surveil-
lance cameras in a Colorado supermarket showed a woman opening 
a Pepsi and inserting a syringe into it. Though simple denial is not an 
accommodative strategy, most experts believe Pepsi was successful 
in restoring its image (Holmes, 1993). However, the Pepsi example 
also demonstrated that, for denial to be effective, organizations must 
summon an enormous amount of evidence for this defensive tactic to 
work effectively.
Managerial Crisis
It is clear by looking at the “recommend” tactics that the manage-
rial crisis presents the most difficult situation for the PR practitioner, 
because only the four tactics recommended for all crisis types seem 
likely to improve the audience’s perception of the organization. Manage-
rial crises are created through skewed management values, deception, 
misconduct, or some combination of the three. Because responsibility 
for the crisis rests so heavily on the organization and its leadership, it 
makes sense that the only real options available all admit that a crisis 
occurred and then attempt to compensate, correct, or apologize for that 
event. For example, in 2016, Wells Fargo Bank experienced a serious 
managerial crisis when thousands of employees created 1.5 million fake 
accounts and 565,000 credit card accounts for existing customers, none 
of which were authorized by those customers, to earn bonuses and 
meet aggressive sales targets (Comcowich, 2016). Although the firm 
apologized and eventually engaged in corrective action by discontinu-
ing the incentive program, they shifted the blame to (and fired) 5,300 
lower level employees. Unfortunately, this failed to address the real 
problem: skewed management values that focused on the short-term 
profits of cross-selling.
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Our tactical guidelines imply that shifting the blame likely would 
have had a negative effect on people’s perceptions of the organization, 
and that is exactly what happened with Wells Fargo. The organiza-
tion’s attempt to shift the blame overshadowed its other image repair 
tactics and brought them stinging rebukes from the media and Sena-
tor Elizabeth Warren on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, among others (Peck & Carter, 2016). Therefore, in 
a managerial crisis, organizations must focus on compensation, cor-
rective action, mortification, and good intentions and do everything 
possible to steer clear of other tactics.
Malevolence Crisis
Five tactics have potential to improve the audience’s perception of the 
organization in a malevolence crisis situation: compensation, corrective 
action, mortification, good intentions, and transcendence. Significance 
tests showed that, although shifting the blame does not necessarily help 
the organization’s image, it is at least a significantly more acceptable 
tactic for malevolence than for any of the other three crisis types. This 
makes sense given that the malevolent actor is an easy target for blame 
shifting, and this tactic, combined with several of the recommended 
tactics, might be effective at improving the organization’s image.
Systemic Crisis
There are seven recommended tactical options available for improving 
the organization’s image in a systemic failure crisis: compensation, cor-
rective action, mortification, good intentions, accident, transcendence, 
and minimization. In systemic failure crises, even a number of tactics 
considered defensive seem to be seen as potentially effective. Signifi-
cance testing shows that good intentions is viewed more positively in 
the systemic crisis than in the managerial crisis, and accident is viewed 
more positively in the systemic crisis than in either the managerial or 
malevolence crisis. Although shifting the blame is not recommended 
for any crisis type, it is seen as significantly more positive (or less nega-
tive) for the systemic crisis than for the managerial crisis.
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Natural Disaster
The natural disaster crisis offers the organization the largest number 
of recommended image repair tactical options, including compensa-
tion, corrective action, mortification, good intentions, transcendence, 
accident, minimization, and defeasibility. By its definition, a natural 
disaster is difficult to predict and impossible to control. Given the 
unpredictable nature of natural disasters, it makes sense that good 
intentions and appeals to accident would work in these circumstances, 
despite the fact that they are on the defensive end of the continuum. 
The natural disaster suggests little to no organizational responsibility, 
and therefore there seems to be a larger number of legitimate tactical 
possibilities.
Limitations
These results and our tactical guide clearly identify strategies that are 
and are not recommended. However, recommendations based on the 
public’s positive or negative ratings of tactics may not be consistent with 
realities faced by PR practitioners. For example, we outlined earlier some 
instances where denial might need to be used, even though generally 
it is not seen positively as a strategy. On the other hand, mortification 
(taking responsibility and making an apology) was rated positively for 
all crisis types. However, PR practitioners must be aware that an apol-
ogy can come with legal ramifications. According to Meyers (2016), 
there are currently 38 “I’m sorry” laws taking multiple forms spanning 
37 states and the District of Columbia. Twenty of the jurisdictions 
exempt fault-based apologies from evidence, while 18 jurisdictions 
include fault-based apologies in evidence. When considering an apol-
ogy, PR practitioners must be aware of state laws, and when legal and 
financial liability risks are high, they must consider the use of language 
that emphasizes sympathy and empathy while minimizing fault. This 
would be in line with findings by Coombs and Holladay (2008) that 
“respondents had similar reactions to sympathy, compensation, and 
apology response strategies” (p. 255). PR practitioners must also evalu-
ate and manage any nonverbal apologies (Meyers, 2016).
For a practitioner guide to be truly useful, it should be depend-
able as a resource across crisis types, contexts, and audiences. While 
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we hope our proposed guidelines offer such versatility of applica-
tion, we know that the design of this study has limitations that make 
broad application something to be proved in practice and over time. 
To consider the relative impact of 14 different crisis tactics and avoid 
impossible complication of research design and analysis, it was neces-
sary to work with a single crisis scenario with some modifications to 
suggest various crisis types. We believe this approach was justified to 
avoid seriously confounding the results. If, for instance, the managerial 
crisis had dealt with some financial impropriety while the malevolence 
crisis dealt with some dangerous equipment failure and the systemic 
and natural disaster crises were similarly distinct in nature, this would 
have introduced a confounding variable into the study. So, for purposes 
of control, the approach taken here was to keep the crisis scenario 
consistent across conditions. At the same time, it does mean that the 
results and implications could be limited to similar crisis scenarios. 
Our scenario involved an organization that was relatively large, loosely 
coupled (Weick, 1976), and institutional, and the crisis outcome was 
rather serious in that it resulted in bodily injury and multiple deaths. 
It is reasonable to question whether the same results would be seen if 
considering these same crisis types for a smaller, for-profit, corporate 
firm in a rapidly changing competitive market or with a crisis that had 
different, much less serious consequences.
We also acknowledge the limitations of looking at individual tactics 
out of context. Respondents were directed to consider a crisis response 
characterized by 14 image repair tactics, but, by design, they were asked 
to consider the tactics individually and one at a time. However, it would 
be a rare occurrence indeed for even a very brief crisis response to rely 
on a single tactic. In response to crises, multiple image repair tactics are 
typically used together in ways, it is hoped, that are seen as consistent 
and complementary.
Future Research
We believe that the preceding guidelines have face validity. In light of 
the limitations discussed, though, we suggest that they should be applied 
with due caution, at least until future research offers greater validation. 
Such research would do well to intentionally consider a different crisis 
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scenario than used here or, even better, to limit consideration to one or 
a few image repair tactics applied to a variety of crisis scenarios. Ad-
ditionally, future work might do well to explore the interplay of tactic 
combinations. Given the promising results by Gribas et al. (2016) and 
from the current study, we believe that such research building on, ex-
tending, and, we hope, validating this work is warranted.
Although we advocate this continued exploration, we also note that 
the findings here, as well as in past related research, were not particularly 
striking in terms of application. For example, in this study, most of the 
tactics showing significant differences across crisis type were middle-
of-the-road tactics; that is, with the exception of simple denial and 
shifting the blame, they were tactics viewed as not highly effective nor 
as highly ineffective. For the most part, crisis type seems most relevant 
when considering image repair tactics that, at best, may have a slightly 
positive to slightly negative impact on audience perception. Stronger 
findings related to tactics with greater positive or negative impact would 
have offered something more worthy of a PR practitioner’s attention.
What is striking is how similar these findings are to those from 
other studies (Brown & White, 2011; Claeys et al., 2010; Coombs & 
Holladay, 1996; Gribas et al., 2016). The search for the ideal tactics to 
suit particular crises, audience types, and other situational variables 
has yet to reveal exceptional and compelling prescriptive advice for 
practitioners. Given this, it seems possible that the way people perceive 
organizational image repair attempts may rest in something less situ-
ational and more in cultural notions of effective “apologia.” As applied 
in rhetorical criticism, apologia is understood as a formal defense or 
justification of actions. The results of these organizational image re-
pair studies, all of which have utilized U.S. participants, suggest that 
there might be an underlying cultural apologia script that demands 
organizations in crisis embrace certain culturally appropriate accom-
modative responses and avoid certain culturally inappropriate defensive 
responses. So it may be that there are culturally derived social scripts 
dictating proper organizational image repair efforts, no matter the type 
of crisis or audience.
Initial support for this possibility has been found in a work in prog-
ress by DiSanza, Legge, Hartman, Carr, and Gribas (2017) that compared 
248 gribas, disanza, legge, and hartman
U.S. and Middle Eastern respondents in regard to their perceptions of 
the effectiveness of various image repair tactics. Preliminary analyses 
suggested that U.S. participants responded very favorably to accommo-
dative tactics and very negatively to defensive tactics; however, Middle 
Eastern audiences did not seem to have the same degree of negative 
response to defensive tactics. In fact, for this Middle Eastern sample, 
differences between the most defensive tactics and the most accom-
modative tactics were negligible. Though this is still quite speculative, 
we suggest that cross-cultural studies of the effectiveness of image 
repair tactics is one fruitful new direction for future organizational 
crisis response research.
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